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Abstract - A conflict between efficiency and equity exists in the provision of public education. We 
examine this conflict and consider a compromise approach to school finance, “district power 
equalization” (DPE). DPE has never been implemented in its “pure” form, which would require raising 
tax prices in wealthy districts as well as lowering them in poorer districts. We present simulations of 
districts’ expenditure per pupil under two DPE plans in three states. We find that a “pure” DPE plan 
would reduce variance in expenditure among districts and have sometimes dramatic consequences for 
the rank ordering of districts within a state by expenditure per pupil. 
INTRODUCTION 
GROSS inequalities among school districts in per 
pupil expenditures are the most common target of 
those seeking reform of school finance in the courts 
and through the legislative process. For some the 
issue of greater equality in levels of school outlays 
has been a matter of “fundamental right”’ under the 
equal protection clauses of the U.S. and state 
constitutions. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rodriguez, however, denied elementary and secon- 
dary education the status of a fundamental right 
subject to equal protection. Subsequently, equaliz- 
ation of per pupil expenditures has been demanded 
in the name of equity and as a requirement of state 
constitutional education clauses calling, variously, 
for “thorough and efficient”, “general and uni- 
form”, or otherwise designated systems of public 
schools in the state.’ 
In this paper we are not primarily concerned with 
the legal or philosophical arguments for or against 
equalization. Our purpose, rather, is to cast some 
light on the issues associated with the policy position 
that accepts equalization, in greater or lesser 
degree, as a goal in education finance.3 
We begin with a brief statement on the distri- 
bution of per pupil expenditures in the three states 
that are the focus of our study, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and Virginia. This is followed by an analysis 
of the conflict between equity and efficiency in 
school finance. We then consider a compromise 
approach, “district power equalization”, which 
would reduce inequalities in levels of expenditure by 
altering the terms under which districts obtain state 
aid without forcing local districts to relinquish 
control over spending decisions or revenue policy. 
Following an examination of the options avail- 
able, we proceed to the design of the appropriate 
policy instruments, and then simulate the effects of 
their implementation on districts’ expenditure. 
VARIANCE IN SCHOOL EXPENDITURES 
The Data 
Our analysis focuses on data for Connecticut, 
New Jersey, and Virginia. These states were chosen 
because their school districts are coterminous with 
overlying units of local government for which 
relevant U.S. Census data are available and they are 
representative of three regions of the country. State 
aid plays a major role in education finance in each of 
them. Non-categorical or “basic” aid in 1982 
amounted to 22% of total expenditures in Con- 
necticut, 28% in New Jersey, and 34% in Virginia. 
Moreover, the tradition of substantial local fiscal 
autonomy continues to prevail in each of them. 
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Variance in per pupil operating expenditures for 
elementary and secondary education is large in these 
states. This is illustrated in Table 1. The highest 
spending district in Virginia spent over three times 
as much as the lowest district, and the distsrict at the 
95th percentile outspent the one at the 5th percen- 
tile by almost two to one. The coefficient of 
variation (SD over the mean), at 0.23, provides a 
more general measure of the disparities that pre- 
vailed. Variance was less extreme in Connecticut 
and New Jersey, but it was certainly large enough to 
invoke serious concerns about both equity in and 
adequacy of school financing in these states. 
Local Autonomy and Determinants of Demand 
Apart from curriculum requirements and other 
constraints imposed by the state, education expen- 
ditures are subject to forces governing demand in 
much the same fashion as goods and services in 
general. Differences among school districts in levels 
of expenditure are attributable, for the most part, to 
differences among them in demand for education. If 
we are to reduce variance in expenditures for 
schools, the design of the policy instruments for 
doing so must begin with those factors governing 
demand. For this purpose we refer to our studies of 
the demand for education (Brazer and McCarty, 
1986, 1987). The estimated equations presented 
there suggest that demand is a function of “tax 
price”4 and income, as well as indicators of prefer- 
ences such as proportion of the population of the 
community who are aged, who are owner occupiers, 
who have less than a high school education, and who 
voted Democratic in the most recent Presidential 
election (1980), and characteristics of school dis- 
tricts such as the size and rate of growth of public 
school enrollment. These results are reproduced in 
Appendix A. 
It follows that policy instruments designed to 
affect demand for education must look to these 
variables, some of which may be directly or in- 
directly influenced by state policy and some of which 
obviously cannot be so influenced. Thus it may be 
possible, for example, to design a system of state aid 
that compensates for low income or property 
wealth, but not for voter preferences or the edu- 
cational attainments of the adult population. Prefer- 
ences, if they are to be affected, must be approached 
through means other than fiscal instruments, while 
other factors, such as the age distribution of the 
population, are beyond short-run influences. 
EQUITY AS POLICY OBJECTIVE 
Defining Equity 
Equality of expenditure per pupil among school 
districts has been seen as a means of realizing equity 
for low income pupils resident in central cities and 
close-in suburbs.5 At issue, although not commonly 
discussed before the courts, is the appropriateness 
of this definition of equity. Equality in per pupil 
expenditures is neither necessarily equitable nor 
acceptable as a policy objective. We turn now to 
alternative definitions of equity in education, and 
examine the relationship of each to the goal of equal 
expenditure per pupil.6 
Equality in educational achievement defines 
equity in its most demanding form, one which the 
school system alone should not even be encouraged 
to seek, for to do so would entail unimaginably high 
costs. Its attainment would require some means of 
restraining higher achieving pupils, a prospect that 
Table 1. Education expenditure per pupil 1981-1982 
Minimum 

















Maximum 95th percentile 
Minimum 5th percentile 
Connecticut 2584.1 0.17 2.04 1.82 
New Jersey 2841.6 0.17 2.74 1.74 
Virginia 2067.4 0.23 3.10 1.80 
Source: See Appendix. 
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would be extremely wasteful of human resources 
and would drive pupils from strongly supportive 
home environments and with high endowments of 
learning abilities out of the public school system. At 
the same time the costs of raising the achievement 
levels of the less well endowed are likely to exceed 
any conceivable measure of benefits long before we 
should have realized equal educationai achieve- 
ment. 
If all children possessed equal endowments and 
were subject to identical non-school environmental 
factors, equal school expenditures might bring 
equality in educational achievement. But even with 
equal expenditures among school districts equal 
achievement might not be attained. Equal numbers 
of dollars do not ensure equal quality or even 
quantity of resources; wages and salaries vary, as 
does the quality of teachers, principals, support 
staff, and other inputs, and so does the efficiency 
with which these resources are used to produce 
educational outcomes. Moreover, the distribution of 
funds among schools within districts, or within 
schools among classrooms, may not be equal. And 
once it is recognized that pupils possess a wide range 
of personal endowments and are exposed to vastly 
differing non-school environments, it becomes 
apparent that equal achievement is not even re- 
motely related to equal expenditures. 
Alternatively, equity in school finance may be 
defined as equal educational opportunity. This 
definition requires that a pupil’s chances for success 
in acquiring cognitive and social skills be indepen- 
dent of the school he attends. It recognizes the 
limitations of the role of the schools in dete~ining 
levels of educational achievement. It acknowledges 
implicitly the influence of differences in home and 
neighborhood environments, in private supplements 
to the public school experience, and in the personal 
endowments of the pupil that make for higher or 
Iower levels of educational achievement. 
Equality of educationai opportunity defined in 
this way seeks the more attainable equality among 
schools rather than among pupils. Our educational 
system, then, would be equitable when the level of 
educational achievement attained by a child is 
independent of the school he attends. 
Does this objective require equal per pupil ex- 
penditures? Perhaps the most that can be said for 
the part played by differences in dollar outlays for 
education is that more dollars afford more scope for 
pursuing ways and means of inducing pupils to learn 
more; they may facilitate the learning process. We 
expect that reducing variance in expenditures should 
bring us closer to equal educational op~~unity; it is 
difftcult to imagine that the direction of its influence 
can be otherwise. The available evidence suggests, 
however, that the magnitude of the change attain- 
able with a more equal spread of dollars is rather 
narrowly limited.’ 
Thus reducing inequality in expenditures may be 
viewed as a desirable policy objective, but not one 
to be pursued without regard for other concerns. Its 
merit lies in its capacity to move the system some 
unknown distance toward the goal of equal edu- 
cational opportunity. But there are costs associated 
with reducing inequality. Reduction in inequality 
may be attainable only at the expense of economic 
efficiency. 
Equity and Efficiency 
Advocates of equal expenditures have often 
envisioned a state centralized system of financing 
education, such as obtained in Hawaii and in most of 
the world outside of North America. But, as Table 1 
indicates, the demand for education varies widely 
among school districts, and therefore any imposed 
uniform level of expenditures will involve substan- 
tial welfare losses, This follows because that level 
will be higher than some communities would de- 
mand and lower than would be preferred by others. 
Figure 1, in which it is assumed that there are two 
districts, one exhibiting a higher and the other a 
Figure 1. 
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lower demand for education expenditures than a 
state-mandated level, illustrates the point. We 
assume that they both face the same constant cost of 
education expenditure. 
The state mandated level of school expenditures is 
given by Es, the high- and low-demand districts’ 
compensated demand curves are DH and DL, while 
the levels preferred by the high- and low-demand 
districts, respectively, given their incomes, prices, 
and preferences, are EH and EL. For the high- 
demand district, the welfare loss associated with the 
state mandated level of expenditure is measured by 
the triangular area ABC, the excess of the value to it 
of EsEH units of education over their Cost, 
ACEHE% For the low-demand district, the welfare 
loss is given by the area AFG, the excess of the cost 
of ELEs dollars of expenditure over their value to 
the district, FGE,EL. The welfare loss to the state 
as a whole is the sum of the two triangles. From an 
economic efficiency standpoint welfare would be 
enhanced by allowing the hip-demand district to 
spend more and the low-demand district less than 
the state determined ES.* 
Thus if equity is sought through mandated equal- 
ity of expenditures the outcome may reflect neither 
equity nor efficiency, given the inadequacy of equal 
expenditures as an equity criterion. Furthermore, if 
a state did choose to accept welfare losses to achieve 
equality of expenditure, much of what might appear 
to be gained in terms of equality of educational 
opportunity would be illusory. In fact people in the 
high-demand district are likely to spend more than 
the state allowance, either by supplementing the 
public school experience with lessons in the private 
sector or by moving into the private school system. 
In districts where state-mandated public school 
spending exceeds the demand for education, on the 
other hand, we should expect less than full use of the 
available resources. 
Nevertheless, states may wish to move in the 
direction of reducing inequalities in per pupil ex- 
penditures among districts insofar as they reflect 
more than different preferences. These inequalities 
also reflect large differences among districts in 
income and property wealth, differences that may 
frustrate preferences and lead to educational 
deprivation. Even after recognizing the limited 
influence of differences in expenditures on. edu- 
cational outcomes, ratios of two to one and higher in 
per pupil expenditures are likely to represent far less 
than equality of educational opportunity. 
The challenge is to find a means of reducing 
inequality in educational op~~unity without im- 
posing social costs as large as those involved in state 
mandated equality of expenditures. This requires 
leaving budgetary decision making in the hands of 
the local community while influencing that process 
through state policy. The goal in the design of 
appropriate policy instruments is to compensate for 
differences in resources and in income while leaving 
scope for the play of community preferences and 
priorities. Some sacrifice of efficiency seems inevit- 
able and should be recognized as a cost of improving 
equity. 
When we confront the question of the ways in 
which the state may exert its influence on local 
demand for education expenditure we find that its 
opportunities are limited. The only major deter- 
minant of demand that is readily amenable to 
effective state policy intervention is tax price. 
Raising or lowering districts’ tax prices enables a 
state to induce them to spend less or more than they 
otherwise would. Thus, as we illustrate in Fig. 2, the 
high-demand district facing an increase in tax price 
reduces its expenditures from EH to EH’, while the 
low-demand district, experiencing a cut in tax price, 
moves up from EL to EL’. While less equality is 
achieved than with a state mandated expenditure 
level, efficiency losses are considerably smaller - 
triangles BCD and GHI rather than ACE and AFI. 
The more the state alters tax prices, the more 
equality it can achieve and the larger efficiency 
losses become.’ 
E, E; E, E;, E, 
Figure 2. 
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STATE MATCHING-AID POLICY 
ALTERNATIVES 
Tax price, P,, given by the expression” P, = 
(HdV)(l-m)(l-mfr)n, is readily subject to 
manipulation by the state. For purposes of our 
analysis we assume that n, the number of pupils, is 
given and is not subject to policy control, and that 
the same is true of mtr, the marginal income tax rate 
of the median taxpayer, H,,,, the local tax base of 
that taxpayer, and V, the total local tax base. Thus 
the extent to which P, is subject to policy control 
will depend on how we define the matching rate, 
m, ” and the impact on expenditures of changes in 
P, will depend on the elasticity of demand for 
education. 
Equal Yield 
One possible definition of m derives from a policy 
position that argues that the ability of each school 
district to raise funds should be independent of the 
size of its per pupil tax base, typically state equalized 
value of taxable property per pupil (SW). Thus we 
define m as (1 - SEV~SEV,), where SEVi is the 
individual district’s SEV and SEVs is the state 
support level of SEV. This definition of m yields 
what has been variously called “district power 
equalizing” (DPE) (Coons et al., 1971), percentage 
equalization, or equal yield. This type of state aid 
ensures that each district realizes the same amount 
of revenue per pupil per mill in its tax rate as every 
other district in the state. 
Under equal yield, with m defined as 1 - 
SEVISEV,, irrespective of the district’s tax base its 
revenues per pupil per mill in its levy is $O.OOlSEV~. 
Thus, for example, if SEV, is set at $100,000, a 
district levying 20 mills on SEVi of $50,000 would 
realize $1000 per pupil from its levy and would 
receive $1000 from the state. A “rich” district, with 
SEVi of $200,000, would realize $4000 from the 
same tax rate and would remit $2000 to the state. 
Each district would have revenues equal to $2000 
per pupil. Note that m for the low SEV district is 0.5 
and for the high SEV district it is -1. Equal yield 
reduces P, by half in the one case and doubles it in 
the second. 
Existing tax prices in Connecticut, New Jersey, 
and Virginia are functions of their current defin- 
itions of m. The aid formula for each of these states 
falls well short of full DPE or equal yield.‘* These 
formulas produce tax prices that are higher than 
they would be under full-blown equal yield for most 
districts with tax bases per pupil (SEVi) lower than 
our assumed state support level. High SEV districts, 
on the other hand, will experience increases in tax 
price under DPE. 
Equal Yield with Income Weighting 
Since our estimated tax price elasticities of de- 
mand range from -0.14 in New Jersey to -0.32 in 
Connecticut,‘3 we know that the expenditure equal- 
izing effects of DPE will vary among the states. 
Given these elasticities we also know that it will take 
large changes in tax price to bring about appreciable 
expenditure equalization. 
A frequently voiced criticism of DPE holds that it 
is not an effective equalizing mechanism because it 
does not take differences in income into account. 
And, as we have indicated, our demand equations 
suggest that expenditures for education are sensitive 
to differences among school districts in levels of 
median family income. l4 DPE is easily modified to 
take relative income into account. This is done by 
attaching an income weight to m. In this alternative 
formulation my = (1 - (SEV,lSEV,)(Yi/Y,)], where 
SEVi and SEV, are as previously defined and Y, and 
Yi are median family income for the state and for the 
school district. This alternative yields a definition of 
tax price as P+, = (H,,,IV)(l - m,)(l - mtr)n. 
The virtue of this approach is that it recognizes 
that the same tax price will not give rise to the same 
expenditure per pupil where one of two districts is a 
low income industrial enclave or rural resort com- 
munity, while the other is a high income suburb. 
Estimates of income and price elasticities lend 
credence to the expectation that the lower income 
districts will often spend less, even where tax price is 
lower, other things equal. This follows from the fact 
that the elasticities estimated for income are sub- 
stantially greater in absolute terms than the price 
elasticities.” 
In Table 2 we present descriptive statistics for tax 
price under three alternatives, each of which carries 
the same budgetary cost to the state. They are the 
aid system in effect in 1981-1982, full DPE, and. 
income-weighted DPE. In general moving to DPE 
reduces the mean tax price, but it increases it for 
property rich districts, where SEVi exceeds SEV,, 
and reduces it for property poor districts.” But 
going from DPE to DPE-Income tends to increase 
average tax price while reducing it for relatively low 
256 Economics of Education Review 
income districts and raising it for those with high 
median family incomes. 
The estimated price elasticities of demand of 
-0.32, -0.14, and -0.28 for Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and Virginia” tell us that a 1% change in tax 
price will bring a state-average change in per pupil 
expenditure ranging from about lh to ih of 1%. We 
have estimated the expected effects of changing tax 
prices by introducing DPE and DPE-Income. The 
results of our simulation experiment follow. 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
Using equations that relate education expenditure 
per pupil to its determinants, we can simulate the 
effects of implementing full DPE or DPE-Income. 
We use our estimated regression coefficients for 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Virginia (which are 
reprinted in Appendix A) to predict districts’ 1981- 
1982 expenditure per pupil under these matching aid 
plans.‘s 
We present in Table 3 results for the three policy 
options for which descriptive statistics on tax prices 
are found in Table 2. Our benchmark levels of 
expenditure are given by the values that obtained 
under the aid programs actually in effect in 1981- 
1982. However, the values to be seen in the rows 
labeled “Actual aid” are predicted values from the 
regression equations rather than the observed 
values. We opted for this approach in order to 
Table 2. Tax prices under various matching aid plans 
Minimum Maximum Mean SD Coefficient of variation 
Actual aid 0.09 0.42 
DPE 0.19 0.56 
DPE-Income 0.12 1.07 
Actual aid 0.07 2.34 
DPE 0.10 0.70 
DPE-Income 0.04 1.19 
Actual aid 0.03 0.61 
DPE 0.10 0.27 






























Mean SD Coefficient of variation 
Connecticut 
2584.1 395.43 0.15 
2628.9 265.63 0.10 











2841.6 359.23 0.13 
2470.4 281.19 0.11 
2474.1 272.28 0.11 
Actual aid 1612.9 4258.7 
DPE 1707.5 4071.7 
DPE-Income 1720.7 4010.0 
Virginia 
2067.4 425.24 0.21 
2149.5 387.06 0.18 
2188.4 376.13 0.17 
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isolate the effects of changes in the aid formula from 
differences between observed and predicted values 
attributable to errors of estimation. 
Overall Results 
Our measure of variance among districts in 
educational expenditures per pupil is the coefficient 
of variation.19 Under the existing system of aid this 
coefftcient ranges from 0.13 in New Jersey to 0.21 in 
Virginia. In each of the states our simulations 
predict that DPE would reduce variance in levels of 
expenditure. The most dramatic change is seen in 
Connecticut, where the coefficient of variation is 
0.10 under DPE and 0.15 under the actual aid 
formula. Inevitably the effects are smaller in New 
Jersey and Virginia because the estimated price 
elasticities are substantially smaller in those states 
than in Connecticut. 
Shifting from the existing state aid system to DPE 
appears to affect the average level of school 
expenditures to varying degrees across states. In 
Connecticut and Virginia it brings a modest increase 
in expenditures, whereas in New Jersey mean 
outlays fall sharply, from $2842 to $2470. In Con- 
necticut and Virginia, property poor districts in- 
crease their expenditures by more than the rich 
districts reduce their’s, whereas in New Jersey quite 
the opposite occurs. 2o It is also interesting to 
observe that, in each of the states, moving from 
DPE to DPE-Income has no appreciable effect on 
levels of expenditure; the higher outlays of low 
income districts are offset almost exactly by reduc- 
tions in high income districts. 
The DPE-Income aid plan appears to have rela- 
tively little effect on’ the degree of equality com- 
pared with DPE. But the statistics presented in 
Table 4 suggest that this plan may be preferred 
because of its impact on the size and direction of the 
influence on predicted expenditures of property 
wealth (SEV) and median family income (Y). For all 
three states we find that these two variables are 
highly and positively correlated with expenditure 
levels under the existing aid system. The shift to 
DPE reduces the correlation coefficients appreci- 
ably in Connecticut and New Jersey but not in 
Virginia, and moving to DPE-Income yields small 
but consistently negative coefficients for the first 
two states. Neither of the alternative aid policies 
produces changes in any relevant dimensions for 
Virginia, essentially because our estimating 
Table 4. Correlation between predicted expenditure, SEV 
per pupil, and median family income under various 
matching aid plans 























equation for that state contains a price elasticity 
coefficient that approaches zero. 
Individual Districts 
While it is instructive to examine the impact of 
alternative aid systems on the overall picture for the 
distribution within states of per pupil expenditures, 
it may be even more revealing to look at the changes 
brought about among individual districts. Table 5 is 
designed to provide some important insights with 
respect to the effects of alternative aid plans on the 
expenditure ranking of selected districts within each 
state, the five wealthiest and the five poorest in 
terms of SEV, and the five largest. Rankings of 
predicted expenditure are presented for each of 
three aid options. 
In Connecticut, the expenditure rankings of many 
districts change dramatically as we substitute one aid 
plan for another. Hartford, for example, which 
ranks lowest among Connecticut districts with 
respect to both income and property wealth, still 
managed to rank 21st out of 99 districts in our 
sample in 1981-1982 in terms of per pupil education 
expenditures. Under DPE we estimate it would 
move up to rank 4, while under DPE-Income it 
would rank 1. Each of the others among the state’s 
lowest ranking districts in terms of SEV would 
improve its ranking substantially, but only Wolcott 
would rise above the median. 
Among Connecticut’s richest districts, measured 
by SEV, all five were among the top ten highest 
spending districts under the prevailing aid system. 
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Table 5. Predicted rankings of selected districts by expenditure per pupil under alternative aid plans 
District SEV rank 
Connecticut 







99 99 21 4 1 
98 94 96 96 78 
97 85 90 81 56 
96 91 99 98 91 

















Largest districts Number of pupils 
Waterbury 14,074 43 16 
Stamford 14,183 6 12 
New Haven 18,131 31 18 
Bridgeport 20,063 50 45 
Hartford 25,003 21 4 
Number of districts = 99 
District SEV rank 
New Jersey 







380 380 347 
379 360 379 
378 378 257 
377 338 356 












1 232 75 
2 11 2 
3 355 184 
4 321 65 
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District SEV rank 
Virginia 







121 89 118 112 110 
120 119 121 118 114 
119 80 96 81 81 
118 
117 
: 38 19 21 














Number of pupils 
33.741 
11 25 22 
51 82 82 
1 1 1 
8 10 10 
3 3 3 
87 86 93 
Norfolk 341789 10 9 8 
Prince William Countv 35.263 67 69 75 
’ Virginia Beach 
Fairfax County 
Number of districts = 121 
54;482 44 46 53 
121,470 6 8 9 
Moving to DPE pushes all of them out of the top 
ten, with Waterford and Greenwich being affected 
most drastically as they drop to ranks 76 and 37, 
respectively. All but Waterford among the richest 
districts fall further with the substitution of DPE- 
Income, under which New Canaan would rank 90th. 
Waterford’s position is actually slightly improved 
under this switch because, while it enjoys a very high 
SEV, its Y is well below the state average. 
Among the state’s largest central city school 
dist,ricts Hartford, as we have seen, moves up 
sharply as we shift toward DPE-Income, and Water- 
bury, New Haven, and Bridgeport all make it to the 
top ten under this approach. The relatively rich 
Stamford district, as expected, moves down. 
Changes in districts’ rankings are determined by 
our estimated tax price and basic aid coefficients 
(under both DPE plans, tax price values change and 
non-matching basic aid falls to zero), as well as by 
the particular values of those variables in each 
district. For example, Hartford’s actual tax price is 
ranked 19th out of the 99 districts in our Connecticut 
sample, but its tax price would be ranked 67th under 
DPE and 99th under DPE-Income. This change in 
tax price ranking results in Hartford’s dramatic 
increase in predicted expenditure ranking under 
DPE-Income. 
Similar patterns appear in New Jersey. Camden 
and Newark, among the state’s poorest and largest 
districts, change their rankings from 347 and 257 out 
of 380 under the aid system of 1981-1982 to 150 and 
33 under DPE and 15 and 2 under DPE-Income. 
East Orange also experiences a large upward 
movement as it goes from ranking 219 to 5. Jersey 
City too would benefit enormously from a shift in 
aid plan to DPE-Income. 
Among New Jersey’s highest SEV districts Cape 
May, a resort community with low Y, would fare 
poorly under DPE, somewhat better under DPE- 
Income, while Englewood Cliffs, rich under both 
criteria, would drop sharply from a ranking of 2 to 
203 in school expenditures. 
Not much can be made of our simulations for 
Virginia. The low estimated price elasticity simply 
precludes there being any appreciable impact from 
changes in the aid formula that work through their 
influence on tax price.*’ 
Further insights into the impact on district expen- 
ditures of the introduction of a DPE-Income aid 
plan may be gained by computing the difference 
260 Economics of Education Review 
between predicted expenditure with DPE-Income 
and with actual aid, and regressing this variable on 
SEV and Y.” The coefficients of both variables 
should be negative - higher property wealth and 
income will lead to higher tax prices under DPE- 
Income and, consequently, to smaller increases or to 
decreases in expenditures. 
The results of this regression are presented in 
Table 6. For Connecticut, they indicate that, on 
average, $lO,CKlO more in SEV or $1000 more in Y 
would be associated with a $28 drop in district 
expenditures per pupil if the State were to adopt 
DPE-Income aid. For New Jersey the same increase 
in SEV would bring a drop of $15 in expenditures 
and a $1000 increment in income a reduction of $22. 
Predicted effects are far smalIer for Virginia, again 
because of its low tax price eiasticity.23 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Equity, in education finance as eisewhere, is an 
elusive concept. We reject the notion that its 
achievement requires equal per pupil expenditure 
among school districts. We come, rather, to the 
conclusion that it may best be defined in terms of 
equality of educational opportunity, defined to 
mean that a pupil’s success or failure in acquiring 
cognitive and social skills is independent of the 
school he or she attends. Our observation of the 
distribution of expenditures among school districts 
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Virginia strongly 
suggests that equity as so defined is not being 
realized. And it seems to us a fair presumption that 
more equal expenditures would bring equal edu- 
Table 6. Determinants of differences in predicted expen- 
diture per pupil generated by introduction of a DPE- 
Income aid plan* 
Connecticut New Jersey Virginia 
Constant 1234.8 436.0 386.3 
(38.32) (27.25) (32.25) 
SEV -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0006 
(-24.36) (-33.05) (-25.63) 
Y -0.028 -0.022 -o.OO!J 
(-19.17) (;$I31 (-13.39) 
II 99 121 
RZ 0.96 0.90 0.90 
r-ratios are in parentheses. 
*Dependent variable = Predicted expenditure under a 
DPE-Income aid plan minus predicted expenditure under 
the State’s actual aid plan. 
cational opportunity closer to realization than it is 
now. 
We recognize, however, that inducing some 
districts to spend more and some less necessarily 
entails social costs that rise with the dimensions of 
the inducements, the extreme case being state 
mandated equality of expenditures among districts. 
We are, therefore, involved in the trade-off between 
equity and efficiency. Our suggested compromise is 
a distinct power equalizing (DPE) aid plan or a DPE 
plan modified to account for income (DPE-In- 
come), either of which would achieve substantial 
equalization in New Jersey and Connecticut. 
Perhaps the most objectionable feature of these 
plans and the simulated results that follow from 
their adoption is that they would induce the richer 
districts in these states to cut educational expen- 
ditures sharply. It is not apparent to us that this 
would be of benefit to anyone or that it represents 
the most desirable way of partially funding higher 
outlays by the poorer districts. Throughout our 
simulations we have assumed that the states’ contri- 
butions to local school funding through non-cate- 
gorical aid would remain at their actual 1981-1982 
levels. But this assumption may render the DPE 
plans both politically and philosophically unaccept- 
able. This is true particufarly in New Jersey, where 
introduction of DPE in either form would bring so 
large a reduction in the expenditures of the richer 
districts that total school expenditures would fall 
sharply. 
Full DPE requires the richer districts to contrib- 
ute portions of their tax levies to the state for 
redistribution to poorer districts. It is difficult to 
imagine that many of the richer districts would find 
this tolerable. Moreover, it is this contribution to 
the state pool of funds that raises the tax price of 
education for rich districts and leads to curtailment 
of their expenditures and, very likely, to a loss of 
public support for education. On balance there may 
be gains in equity, but it is not clear that the costs of 
their attainment do not exceed the value of those 
gains. 
The judgement at which we arrive is that it is 
possible to realize major gains in equity, albeit while 
incurring substantial efficiency losses, but the out- 
look for so doing is not bright unless the states are 
willing and able to increase their participation in 
funding education. It is unlikely to be possible or 
even desirable to increase adequately funding for 
poorer districts exclusively at the expense of richer 
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districts. Rather, it is the state’s revenue system as a educational opportunity is to be a politically attain- 
whole that must assist poorer districts if equal able goal at a cost that is reasonably sustainable. 
NOTES 
1. See, for example, the position of plaintiffs in Serruno v. Priesf, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1211, % 
Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971) and Sun Anronio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
2. For a review of school finance litigation and court decisions, see Lindquist and Wise (1976). 
3. Public Economics offers virtually no support for equality of expenditures for education. The fact 
that most identifiable benefits deriving from elementary and secondary education are appropriable by 
the consumer-pupil renders education a “private good”, one that is both publicly and privately 
supplied in this country. It may be said to differ from other private goods to the extent that its 
consumption gives rise to externalities or benefits enjoyed by the population at large, directly or 
indirectly. That is, in Professor Musgrave’s terms it is a good satisfying a “merit want” (Musgrave, 
1958). This characteristic argues for subsidizing its consumption, so that expenditure on it may exceed 
the level that would obtain if external benefits were ignored. But it says nothing in support of 
equalizing expenditures - everyone’s consumption of education should be subsidized. Equalization 
must, therefore, rest on other grounds, grounds having more to do with philosophical notions of 
justice and with one’s faith in education as the means of achieving social mobility than with 
economics. At the same time efforts to find mandates for equality of expenditures in constitutional 
language are quite beside the point in a normative discussion of the issue, and presumably only 
lawyers are qualified to seek positive meanings in that language. 
4. Tax price is defined as the cost to the median taxpayer of an additional dollar of expenditure per 
pupil for elementary and secondary education. It may be expressed as P, = (H,,,/V)(l - m)(l - 
mrr)n, where H,,, is the median taxpayer’s local tax base (typically his home), V is the total local tax 
base, m is the rate at which the state matches local school exmnditures. mtr is the marginal income tax 
rate of the median taxpayer in the community, and n is thk number of pupils. - 
5. Amone suits broueht in behalf of such children are Robinson v. Cahill. 70 N.J. 464. 360 A.2d 400 
(1976) i;New Jersei and Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free School D&rict v. Nyqu& 453 N.Y.S. 
643 (1982) in New York. 
6. For a detailed discussion of measures of equity in school finance, see Berne and Stiefel (1984). 
7. Extensive studies of the educational production function have shown consistently that those things 
that money can buy for schools play only a minor role in determining children’s educational 
attainments. See, for example, Bowles (1970) and Summers and Wolfe (1977). 
8. This analysis treats education as though it were a purely private good. To the extent that it generates 
positive externalities, the welfare loss triangles in Figs 1 and 2 may be overstated. 
9. All of this reasoning rests, of course, on the assumption, generally supported by the findings of 
empirical studies of demand for education, that tax price and education expenditure are negatively 
correlated, and that state policy will yield changes in tax prices that are positive for high spending and 
negative for low spending districts. 
10. See note 4 supra. 
11. m may apply either to total expenditures in the school district for education or to the local share of 
that expenditure. If it applies to the total it appears in the expression defining tax price as indicated in 
the text; if it applies to the local share it enters the definition of tax price in the term (111 + m). When 
m = 1 in the latter case it is 0.5 in the former. 
12. A good source of information on state aid formulas is Tron (1980). Also see State of Connecticut 
Board of Education, Guaranteed Tux Base: Grunt Calculation Workbook, Hartford, CT, Virginia 
Education Association. ABCs of School Finnnce, Richmond, VA, and Salmon er al. (1988). 
13. The estimated coefficients for our education expenditure equations are presented in Appendix A. 
14. The income elasticities are 0.62, 0.32, and 0.48, for Connecticut, New Jersey, and Virginia, 
respectively. Brazer and McCarty (1987), p. 559. 
15. In line with the notion of the “flypaper effect”, as expounded by Courant et al. (1979), among 
others, it might be thought that the appropriate way to respond to the demonstrated sensitivity to 
income would be through increasing lump sum grants, equivalent, theoretically, to increases in 
income when multiplied by tax share (H,,,/V). But this view is not supported by our earlier estimates, 
where the elasticities of expenditures with respect to lump sum grants (BASICAID) were consistently 
not significantly different from zero. Lump sum grants in these instances seem not only not to “stick 
where they hit”, they appear, rather, to substitute for local taxes. 
16. SEV, is determined in each state at the level which yields a total for basic or non-categorical state 
aid per pupil equal lo the actual amount received in 1981-1982, $567, $790, and $700, respectively, in 
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Connecticut, New Jersey, and Virginia. Thus it differs between the alternative forms of DPE while, as 
noted in the text, the states’ budgetary costs remain constant. 
17. We have had to perform the Virginia simulations using a revised version of the regression presented 
in Brazer and McCarty (1987). The coefficient for BASICAID in that regression is negative and 
relatively large (-0.14). As a result, the simulations performed with that regression yield results that 
are improbable in the extreme. We have re-estimated the equation with aid in per pupil form instead 
of being multiplied by tax share. The resulting aid coefficient estimates are more in line with our 
expectations, permitting us to proceed with the simulation exercise. It should be noted, however, that 
the estimated tax price coefficient falls from -0.28 to -0.07 when we make this change in 
BASICAID. 
18. In New Jersey, the aid formula in effect in 1981-1982 reimburses districts for a fraction of their 
expenditure in the year after the expenditure is made. There is some disagreement as to whether or 
not this constitutes matching aid. We have chosen not to treat it as such; however, we have run our 
New Jersey regression with the alternative assumption, that New Jersey’s equalization aid is matching 
aid. When we do this, the estimated tax price coefficient falls from -0.14 to -0.07. If the matching- 
aid specification is the correct one, then changing tax prices by implementing DPE or DPE-Income 
aid would have smaller effects on expenditure than our simulation results predict. 
19. The coefficient of variation is the S.D. divided by the mean. 
20. The change in a district’s expenditure when DPE aid is implemented is a function of both the tax 
price and the lump-sum basic aid coefficients in the regressions that are the basis of these simulation 
results. Under DPE aid, all aid is matching; existing lump-sum aid is eliminated. New Jersey’s lump- 
sum basic aid coefficient is of the opposite sign and is considerably larger in magnitude than those of 
the other states (NJ: 0.0127; CT: -0.0016; VA: -0.0005). Therefore, when lump-sum aid falls from a 
fairly large positive number to zero, the New Jersey simulations show a fairly large decrease in 
expenditure per pupil. Furthermore, given that the tax price coefficient in New Jersey is quite small, 
there is relatively little increase in expenditure from matching aid to offset this decrease. Hence, we 
see an overall fall in average expenditure per pupil in New Jersey under DPE. 
21. See note 17, supm. As observed there, the elasticity coefficient estimated for basic aid was negative, 
suggesting that lump sum aid would be even more futile. Altogether these results make it clear that 
our estimating equation for Virginia is wholly inadequate. 
22. We compare predicted expenditures under DPE-Income with predicted, rather than observed, 
expenditures under the actual system in order to isolate the influence of the change in aid plan from 
differences attributable to errors of estimation arising from the fact that our equations contain error 
terms that are greater than zero. The differences in predicted expenditures that constitute our sets of 
dependent variables reflect only the change in tax price. 
23. The simulations all assume that each of the districts in a state has a price elasticity of demand for 
education equal to the estimated state average elasticity. Estimates for individual districts based on 
longitudinal data might, of course, vary widely. Hence our results should be regarded as suggestive 
rather than definitive, We are indebted to the editor of this journal for urging that this point be 
recognized explicitly. 
REFERENCES 
Bd. of Educ. (1982) Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyqubt, 453 N.Y.S. 643. 
BERNE, R. and STIEFEL, L. (1984) The Measuremenr of Equity in School Finance. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
BOWLES, S. (1970) Toward an educational production function. In Education, Income, and Human 
Capital (Edited by LEE, H.W.) New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
BRAZER, H.E. and MCCARTY, T.A. (1986) Municipal overburden: an empirical analysis. Econ. Educ. 
Rev. 6(4). 
BRAZER, H.E. and MCCARTY, T.A. (1987) Interaction between demand for education and for municipal 
services. National Tax Journal 60(4). 
COONS. J.E.. CLUNE, W.H. and SUGARMAN, S.D. (1970) Private Wealth and Public Education. 
Cambridge, MA: Bklknap Press. 
. I 
COURANT. P.N.. GRAMLICH. E.M. and RUBINFELD. D. (1979) Public emolovee market Dower and the 
level of government spending. Am. Econ. Rev. 69(S): ’ 
. - 
LINDQUIST, R. and WISE, A. (1976) Developments in education litigation: equal protection. J. Law 
Educ. S(1). 
MUSGRAVE; k.A. (1958) The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Robinson v. Cahill. 70 N.J. 464. 360 A.2d 400 (1976). 
SALMON, R. er al. (1988) Pub&School Finance‘Progiams of the United States and Canada, 1986-1987 
On Equalizing School Expenditures 263 
Blacksburg, Va.: American Educational Finance Association and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University, 1988. 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
Serruno Y. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1211, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971). 
SUMMERS, A.A. and WOLFE, A.B. (1977) Do schools make a difference? Am. Econ. Rev. 67(4). 
TRON, E.O. (1980) Public School Finance Systems 1978-2979. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
APPENDIX A 










































































































































Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses. All regression equations are in log-linear form. 
Coefficients marked with a dagger (t) are significant at the 5% level, and those marked with an asterisk 
(‘) are significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Brazer and McCarty, 1986 and 1987. 
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Variable definitions to accompany Appendix Table A: 
TAXPRICE = The cost to the median voter in additional tax paid of an increase of one dollar in the 
level of expenditure per pupil. 
MEDFMY = Median family income 
BASICAID = Lump-sum state aid (multiplied by the median voter’s tax share) 
STCATAID = Categorical state aid (multiplied by the median voter’s tax share) 
FEDAID = Federal aid (multiplied by the median voter’s tax share) 
AGED = The proportion of the population over age 64 
SECPUP = The proportion of pupils in high school 
NOHS = The proportion of the adult ~pulation that has never finished high school 
VOTE = The proportion of Democratic voters 
PUPFM = The number of pupils per family 
ENRGR = The rate of enrollment growth 
OOC = The proportion of residences that are owner occupied 
PRXV = The fraction of pupils who are enrolled in non-public schools 
POVT = The proportion of the population in poverty 
PUP AND PUPSQ = The number of pupils and the number of pupils squared 
DEPDJST = A dummy variable identifying dependent as opposed to independent school districts 
MEMB = A dummy variable identifying districts that are members of regional high school districts 
NONRS = The proportion of non-resident pupils 
SENT = The proportion of pupils sent to school in other districts 
For further detail concerning these variables, see Brazer and McCarty (1986, 1987). 
APPENDIX B 
Notes on Variable Definition and Sample Selection 
We define “Education expenditure per pupil” as Current operating expenditure for all resident pupiis 
net of transportation expenditure, divided by resident average daily membership (ADM) in Virginia and 
Connecticut, and by resident enrollment in New Jersey. We constructed this variable using a variety of 
sources supplied by the relevant state governments. Details are available from the authors on request. 
We have omitted some districts from our sample in each state. Districts were omitted because they fell 
below our cut-off level of 3000 in district population, because of missing data, or because schools, 
particularly in Connecticut, are shared among otherwise politically separate eommunities. Our sample 
districts contain 86% of statewide enrollment in Connecticut, 81% in New Jersey, and 94% in Virginia. 
